The paper presents a dynamic programming model with multiple classes of capital goods to explain capital expenditures on existing plants over their lives. The empirical specification shows that the path of capital expenditures is explained by (a) complementarities between old and new capital goods, (b) the age of plants, (c) an index that captures the rate of technical change and (d) the labor intensiveness of a plant when it is newly born. The model is tested with Census data for roughly 6,000 manufacturing plants that were born after 1972.
In the beginning, so Genesis tells us, God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form. Unlike the earth, new industrial plants are not, initially, without form, but that form appears to be highly malleable over time. This contrasts with the familiar putty-clay model that assumes great flexibility in the choice of inputs before a plant is built, and virtually no choice after its initial construction. It therefore assumes that plants are built in a single act of creation. The world of plant investment is very different from this. For manufacturing plants for which there is a continuous record for more than twenty years, more than two thirds of the cumulative outlays for plant and equipment over the twenty years occurs after the first three years of the plant's life. And even for plants for which there is a record for only ten years, roughly half of the cumulative investment over ten years takes place after the first three years of life. 1 We know, moreover, that there is considerable bunching of investment outlays over time at the plant level. Following a new plant's initial construction, the first peak in investment on the average occurs as early as the sixth year, and the second peak in the ninth year. Since the average life of manufacturing equipment (as estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 2 ), which reflects the effects of obsolescence as well as wear and tear, is generally much longer, it is obvious that the afore-mentioned investment does not arise from the need to replace worn out equipment. Indeed, the investment 1 . This is based on Census data on the investment histories of roughly 6,000 new manufacturing plants in the period after 1973. 2 . U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Methodology, Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, 1925-94," http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/mp.htm, M27-33. cycles in the first 15-20 years of a plant's life encompass not only equipment but also investment in structures, for which service lives exceed thirty years.
Why do firms choose to add capital to old plants, or replace the equipment of old plants that is physically still functional, rather than investing in completely new production facilities. Surely the choice of capital goods is less constrained in a new than in an old plant. If replacement of equipment is justified because technical change renders new equipment more efficient, is not the flexibility of such choice greater when it is not constrained by the requirement of compatibility with old assets?
There are three reasons why investment in old plants is chosen. (a) New assets do not operate independently of old assets but interact with them. Consequently, relatively small additions or replacements can often greatly augment the output of the combination of old and new assets. 3 (b) Assets obsolesce at very different rates rendering partial replacement for obsolescence a cost-effective option. (c) Initial investments in assets are seldom perfectly balanced. Incremental capacity costs very little for some assets and a great deal for others. 4 Consequently, there is usually spare capacity in some assets to accommodate later additions to others.
Plants, however, do not have infinite lives. Technical change leads to progressive obsolescence of old assets. While one consequence of obsolescence is the creation of opportunities for replacing old with more efficient new assets, the adaptability of old to new assets steadily declines. Hence over the long-run new investment on an old plant will gradually decline as a plant ages and technical change continues leading to the eventual 3 . A dramatic example of this is the addition of high pressure pumps to oil refineries which greatly raises the throughput of refineries. 4 . For example, ducts for wiring usually provide at little additional cost spare capacity for later additions to wiring.
death of the plant. But the pattern of investment on old plants is quite complex, and for a more precise explanation, we turn to our formal model. Section 1 presents our formal model. Section 2 describes the data and the observed investment patterns. Section 3 presents the estimates for the empirical specification of our model. Section 4 concludes with some brief observations of the implications of our results for the comparative analysis of economic growth and for studies of entry barriers.
Formal Model
The literature on capital investment has taken one of two directions with respect to adjustment costs of capital stocks: the convex and the non-convex adjustment cost models. The standard neoclassical theory of investment with convex adjustment costs, as reflected in Lucas (1967) and Gould (1968) , implies a gradual and smooth expansion of capital stock to the desired level. As, however, Hayashi (1982) made clear, investment behavior with convex adjustment costs is not sufficient to explain spikes and lumpiness in investment. Models of investment behavior have, therefore, increasingly relied on the assumption of non-convexity. This, for example, is reflected in Rothschild (1971) and Bertola and Caballero (1990) . The relevant literature is reviewed in Pindyck (1991) while Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999) generate an empirical model to explain spikes in investment at the macroeconomic level, and Doms and Dunne (1994) at the microeconomic plant level, in both cases based on the assumption of non-convexity.
However, neither the assumption of convexity nor of non-convexity by itself adequately explains both the observed spikes in investment behavior and the continuing process of partial substitution of new for older capital goods in response to technical change. To do so requires abandoning the construct of a single, homogeneous capital stock. Boddy and Gort (1971) pointed to some implications of non-homogeneity by showing systematic differences between new and older plants in the ratio of capital outlays on structures to total capital expenditures, while Feldstein and Rothschild (1974) showed how changing the assumptions of homogeneous capital and geometric decay can produce lumpy investment patterns. The most direct foundation for this paper, however, is Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000) who introduce a model with two capital goods:
structures and equipment or, alternatively, old capital and new capital. Within the context of complementary goods, they incorporate non-convex costs of quality adjustment to explain spikes in investment.
With this as a starting point, we develop a dynamic optimization model with n types of capital goods. These are assumed to be complementary both across capital goods of different age and of different type. We also distinguish the process with n types of capital goods, between capacity additions and outlays on replacement. The model is then tested with data at the plant level. In brief, we find support for (a) the assumption of complementarity between old and new capital goods and (b) the conclusion that a combination of both convex and non-convex adjustment cost processes is needed to explain the observed phenomena.
Consider the optimization problem of a plant acting to maximize discounted life- 
The plant maximizes (1) with π and i c C Σ = defined by (2) and (3), respectively, subject to (4). The dynamic programming problem for this analysis where t K is a vector of state variables satisfies the following functional equation:
where
denotes a vector of all n 2 possible value functions with combinations of replaced and added investments. When added investments (capacity additions) for all capital goods are considered, the dynamic programming problem is (6a)
. The optimal added investment to each old capital good is
. This function implies that the added investment of each capital good depends not only on the initial amount of that capital good but also on the initial amount of all other capital goods. As a plant ages, this optimal added investment to old capital goods has the properties:
. That is, investment that adds to the stock of each capital good i (capacity additions) is positive with a decreasing rate over time so that, absent replacement investment, total investment eventually goes to zero.
We have thus far presented a model for capacity additions that relies on assumptions of convexity in costs. We noted earlier, however, that investment in new plants normally consists of complementary capital goods that are not perfectly balanced in terms of their capacity. Since capital goods vary greatly in cost, some unevenness in 6 . With a homothetic production function given by footnote 5, it becomes
outlays will follow from the non-concurrent exhaustion of capacity for less and more expensive capital goods. Thus one cannot infer a smooth adjustment process even for capacity additions. However, the lumpiness that arises from the non-synchronous exhaustion of capacity need not coincide with lumpiness produced by the process of replacement of old capital goods unless scale economies in capital outlays render it efficient to combine additions and replacement.
When replacement investments for all capital goods are considered, the dynamic programming problem is
. The replaced investment of capital good h will be chosen, given all the other capital goods, if ) ( ) (
where the superscript "Rh " denotes the choice of replaced investment of capital good h . This option is defined as
denotes a vector of capital stocks for all capital goods without replacement except for capital good h . The value function given by (6c) yields
This shows that the higher the price of the replaced capital good and the higher the rate of technical change of the non-replaced capital goods, the lower is replacement capital outlays follow a more complex pattern. As can be seen from equation (8), assuming a constant rate of growth in demand and a constant rate of technical change over time, more expensive capital goods will be replaced later since a larger cumulative change in technology is required to justify replacement. On this point, our analysis follows closely that of Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000) .
The replacement activity yields bursts of investment with bunching of replacement outlays. This, in turn, produces investment cycles with intervals of rising and falling investment. Hence, even if there were no non-convexities in costs for capacity additions, the replacement component of total investment is sufficient to produce cycles in investment activity. Ultimately, however, the increasing non-compatibility between old assets acquired when the plant was born and new assets affect replacement as it does additions to capacity. Thus, as a plant ages, replacement investment will ultimately trend downwards. The higher the rate of technical change, the shorter will be the duration of the cycle since replacement of more expensive capital goods will be justified sooner. And the higher the rate of technical change, the steeper will be the long-term downward trajectory of investment outlays on old plants.
The model of investment outlays we have presented is derived from a production function that deviates in an important respect from conventional production functions.
Specifically, old capital and new capital enter as separate but complementary inputs. Thus in assessing the optimal level of investment, complementarities between old and new capital need to be considered much as complementarities between physical and human capital. While our analysis focuses on the microeconomic pattern of investment at the plant level, it has implications for macroeconomic models and for the analysis of investment across economies -a subject on which we briefly comment later. 1973-96. Thus, the average interval for which we had continuous data for a plant was roughly 7 years but ranged to a maximum of 24 years for some plants.
Assuming there were no coding errors, the fact that a plant remained in our record for less than 24 years is attributable to one of three factors: (a) it died prior to 1996, (b Source: Longitudinal Research Data Base. * The first column designates the number of years for which recorded data exist while N designates the number of plants in our sample with data limited to the number of years specified in the first column. T stands for the total capital expenditure ratio, M for the ratio for machinery expenditures and B for the expenditures ratio for buildings.
There are four conclusions to be drawn from Table 1 . First, capital expenditures continue at a fairly high rate relative to a plant's initial size for many years. Second, as a plant ages, the magnitude of initial outlays as a fraction of total accumulated outlays continues to diminish but at a diminishing rate. Third, the observed pattern applies to both machinery and structures though subsequent outlays are somewhat larger relative to initial outlays for machinery than for buildings. Indeed, for buildings no further decline in the relative magnitude of initial outlays is observed after the fourteenth year of a plant's life. In contrast, they decline until at least the twenty-third year of a plant's life for machinery. Fourth, for both machinery and for buildings, post-initial capital outlays cannot possibly be explained as replacement of worn-out and physically decaying capital goods. Rather they reflect either capacity expansion or replacement induced by obsolescence since the outlays occur too early in a plant's life to be explained by physical decay.
Some further insight on the latter conclusion may be gained from looking at the spikes in total capital expenditures for individual plants. For this purpose, we define a spike as a peak in total annual capital expenditures for the plant that occurs just prior to a decline in annual outlays. We find that the first spike occurs on the average as early as the sixth year of a plant's life. The second spike occurs on the average in the ninth year and subsequent peaks continue to occur at roughly three-year intervals.
Empirical Model and Estimates.
We start with the investment outlays of plants as a simple function of their old capital stock and their age as well as the industry technology index. This is based on the empirical implications of equations (7) and (8). A key difference between our model and the usual specification that explains bunching of capital outlays in terms of non-convex adjustment costs is that the latter assumes investment is independent of plant age. Our theoretical framework in Section 1 with multiple classes of capital goods offers an alternative explanation to non-convexity in adjustment costs for the bunching of outlays. Equation (11), however, is too simple an application of that framework to capture the recurrent spikes of investment that arise from each plant's specific configuration of capital goods and their associated obsolescence rates. To the extent that our empirical model (specified below) is partly derived from equation (11), and to the extent that a third degree polynomial in age fails to capture the investment spikes unique to each plant, the resulting 2 R will be reduced accordingly.
To estimate our model in its empirical specification, we introduce a measure of the stock of old capital goods of a plant at time t , which consists of the cumulative gross investment streams from the birth of a plant to 1 − t . Our assumptions about complementarity between old and new capital goods imply that both capacity additions and replacement outlays in t -not just replacement -will be strongly related to the stock of capital goods in 1 − t . Moreover, this relation will depend on the size of the gross stock rather than on its net value after obsolescence has been subtracted.
For an industry technology index, we use the classification of high and low technology based on Hadlock, Hecker and Gannon (1991) . 8 The technology variable is equal to one if a plant is based in a low technology industry and two if it is based in a high technology industry. It will be recalled that a higher rate of technical change reduces the adaptability of new to old capital goods and in this way has a negative effect on investment both for capacity additions and for replacement. This, however, is at least partially offset by the positive effect of technical change on the relative efficiency of new capital goods and, hence, on the rate at which older capital goods are replaced. The net effect of a higher rate of technical change on the investment outlays of a plant for any given span of time can, therefore, only be ascertained empirically.
A further elaboration of the model takes the form of two additional control variables, one related to plant and another to industry attributes. These consist of (a) the initial labor intensiveness of the plant (that is, shortly after its birth) measured by the ratio of employment to the capital stock of a plant in its third year of life and (b) rate of change in industry demand, measured by shipments at the relevant 4-digit SIC level and lagged one year. That is,
where G stands for rate of growth in demand, D for shipments and t for time.
8 . Industries were classified as high or low technology on the basis of the proportion of their total employment engaged in R&D. This was done at the 3-digit SIC level of detail.
The relevance of the initial labor intensiveness of a plant rests on the proposition that technical change tends to be labor saving. Hence, the larger the initial labor input, the greater are the opportunities for replacing old with new capital goods. The relevance of rate of change in industry demand rests on the assumption that when the change is positive and relatively high, individual plants are likely to be producing at their production frontier. Of course growth in the plant's own shipments would be even more directly related to production at the frontier but this variable, in the context of our model, is endogenous and, hence, inappropriate.
We are now ready to test equation (12) below. unbalanced, serial correlation is most unlikely to be important and a Durbin-Watson statistic is not shown.
The results for equation (12) are shown in Table 2 and indicate that all the coefficients of the explanatory variables are associated with high t-values and significant at the 1% level. In general, they strongly support the predicted relations. Notwithstanding the fact that our empirical model is too simple to explain recurrent spikes in investment, the correlations were all quite high for cross-section data.
The results may be summarized as follows:
(a) The coefficient of old capital goods is positive, highly significant and close to unity in log specification at least for total capital expenditures and for machinery. This reflects strong complementarity between old and new capital expenditures and supports the specification of equation (11).
(b) The capital expenditure of plants decline with the age of plants, but not monotonically. The age variable has a negative impact on the capital expenditures of plants. This implies that complementarity between old and new capital goods declines with the age of plants. The positive coefficient of age 2 is consistent with predictions for the interval that replacement rises as a fraction of total investment. The coefficient of age 3 is significant and also has the predicted sign but the coefficient is quite low. This is probably because few plants in our sample were approaching the end of their economic lives.
(c) The industry technology index shows that plants in high technology industries were associated with more capital expenditures than those in the low technology industries.
The index was hypothesized to have a negative impact on additions of new to old capital As a further test of robustness, the specification of two other variables was changed. In estimating equation (12), we measured the stock of old capital goods of a plant at time t by the cumulative gross investment stream from the birth to 1 − t . An alternative hypothesis is that what is decisive is the initial stock of capital measured by cumulative capital expenditures in the first three years of the plant's life. Moreover, an alternative measure was used to assess the rate of technical change for the industry.
Specifically, the following specification for the industry technology index was introduced:
(13) Total value added = Ψ (Production worker hours, chronological time in years).
The information is derived from the NBER-CES Bartlesman-Becker-Gray database. The regression is carried out with time-series data for each U.S. manufacturing industry at the 4-digit SIC level for the periods 1965-1980 and for 1981-1996 . The coefficients of the time variable were then alternative proxies (each for its time interval) for the industry technology index.
The results with these alternative specifications are shown in Table 3 . Once again, the results appear to be quite stable and support the previously reported conclusions. Similarly, expressing the labor intensiveness measure in a log specification changes the results very little.
Conclusions
We have specified a dynamic programming model with multiple categories of capital goods which purports to explain capital expenditures on existing plants over their 
